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Essays in Local Labor Economics
Rebecca Diamond
This dissertation consists of three independent chapters all
related to local labor market and urban economics. Chapter 1
studies the causes and welfare consequences of the increase
in geographic sorting of workers by skill from 1980 to 2000.
Chapter 2 examines the abilities of state and local governments to extract rent from private sector workers by charging
high tax rates and spending the revenue on nonsocial desirable projects, such as excessive government worker wages.
In Chapter 3, which is joint work with Guido Imbens, Michal
Kolesar, and Thomas Barrios, we examine the standard
practice in regression analysis of allowing for clustering in
the error covariance matrix when the explanatory variable of
interest varies at a more aggregate level (e.g., the state level)
than the units of observation (e.g., individuals). This is a
common econometric problem when using geographic variation to study local labor market outcomes.

Chapter 1
The Determinants and Welfare Implications of
U.S. Workers’ Diverging Location Choices by
Skill: 1980–2000
The dramatic increase in the wage gap between high
school and college graduates over the past three decades has
been accompanied by a substantial increase in geographic
sorting of workers by skill.1 Metropolitan areas that had a
disproportionately high share of college graduates in 1980
further increased their share of college graduates from 1980
to 2000. Increasingly high-skill cities also experienced
higher wage and housing price growth than less-skilled cities
(Moretti 2004b; Shapiro 2006).
These facts call into question whether the increase in the
college wage gap reflects a similar increase in the college
well-being gap. Since college graduates increasingly live in
areas with high housing costs, local price levels might offset
some of the consumption benefits of their high wages, making the increase in wage inequality overstate the increase in
consumption or well-being inequality (Moretti 2011b). Alternatively, high-housing-cost cities may offer workers desirable amenities, compensating them for high house prices,
and possibly increasing the well-being of workers in these
cities. The welfare implications of the increased geographic
skill sorting depend on why high- and low-skill workers
increasingly chose to live in different cities.
This chapter examines the determinants of high- and lowskill workers’ choices to increasingly segregate themselves
into different cities and the welfare implications of these
choices. By estimating a structural spatial equilibrium model
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of local labor demand, housing supply, labor supply, and
amenity levels in cities, I show that changes in firms’ relative demands for high- and low-skill labor across cities, due
to local productivity changes, were the underlying drivers
of the differential migration patterns of high- and low-skill
workers.2 Despite local wage changes being the initial cause
of workers’ migration, I find that cities that attracted a higher
share of college graduates endogenously became more desirable places to live and more productive for both high- and
low-skill labor. The combination of desirable wages and
amenities made college workers willing to pay high housing costs to live in these cities. While lower-skill workers
also found these areas’ wages and amenities desirable, they
were less willing to pay high housing costs, leading them to
choose more affordable cities. Overall, I find that the welfare
effects of changes in local wages, rents, and endogenous
amenities led to an increase in well-being inequality between
college and high school graduates that was significantly
larger than would be suggested by the increase in the college
wage gap alone.
To build intuition for this effect, consider the metropolitan areas of Detroit and Boston. The economic downturn
in Detroit has been largely attributed to the decline in auto
manufacturing (Martelle 2012), but the decline goes beyond
the loss of high-paying jobs. In 2009, Detroit Public Schools
had the lowest scores ever recorded in the 21-year history of
the national math proficiency test (Winerip 2011). Historically, the Detroit school district had not always been in such
a poor state. In the early twentieth century, when manufacturing was booming, Detroit’s public school system was lauded
as a model for the nation in urban education (Mirel 1999).
By comparison, Boston has increasingly attracted highskill workers with its cluster of biotech, medical device, and
technology firms. In the mid 1970s, Boston’s public schools
were declining in quality, driven by racial tensions from
integrating the schools (Cronin 2011). In 2006, however, the
Boston public school district won the Broad Prize, which
honors the urban school district that demonstrates the greatest overall performance and improvement in student achievement while reducing achievement gaps among low-income
and minority students. Similar patterns can be seen in the
histories of the Detroit and Boston Symphony Orchestras.3
The prosperity of Boston and decline of Detroit go beyond
jobs and wages, directly impacting the amenities and quality
of life in these areas.
I illustrate these mechanisms more generally using U.S.
census data by estimating a structural spatial equilibrium
model of cities. The setup shares features of the Rosen
(1979) and Roback (1982) frameworks, but I extend the
model to allow workers to have heterogenous preferences
for cities. The fully estimated model allows me to assess the
importance of changes in cities’ wages, rents, and amenities
in differentially driving high- and low-skill workers to different cities.
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I use a static discrete choice setup to model workers’ city
choices.4 The model allows workers with different demographics to differentially trade off the relative values of cities’ characteristics, leading them to make different location
decisions.5 Workers maximize their utility by living in the
city that offers them the most desirable bundle of wages,
housing rent, and amenities.
Firms in each city use capital, high-skill labor, and lowskill labor as inputs into production. High- and low-skill
labor have a constant elasticity of substitution in firms’
production functions. I assume capital is sold in a national
market, while labor is hired locally in a perfectly competitive labor market. Housing markets differ across cities due to
heterogeneity in their elasticity of housing supply.
The key distinguishing worker characteristic is skill, as
measured by graduation from a four-year college. Cities’
local productivity levels differ across high- and low-skill
workers, and the productivity levels of both high- and lowskill workers within a city are endogenously impacted by
the skill mix in the city. Thus, changes in the skill mix of a
city will impact local wages both by moving along firms’
labor demand curves and by directly impacting worker
productivity.
A city’s skill mix is also allowed to influence local amenity levels, both directly, as more-educated neighbors may
be desirable, and indirectly, by improving a variety of city
amenities (Becker and Murphy (2000, Chapter ). Indeed,
observable amenities such as bars and restaurants per capita,
crime rates, and pollution levels improve in areas with larger
college populations and decline in areas with larger noncollege populations. I use the ratio of college to noncollege
employees in each city as a unidimensional index for all
amenities that endogenously respond to the demographics of
cities’ residents.
Workers’ preferences for cities are estimated using a
two-step estimator, similar to the methods used by Berry,
Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004) and the setup proposed by
McFadden (1973). In the first step, a maximum likelihood
estimator is used to identify how desirable each city is to
each type of worker, on average, in each decade, controlling
for workers’ preferences to live close to their state of birth.
The utility levels for each city estimated in the first step
are used in the second step to estimate how workers trade
off wages, rents, and amenities when selecting a location
to live. The second step of estimation uses a simultaneous
equation nonlinear generalized method of moment estimator.
Moment restrictions on workers’ preferences are combined
with moments identifying cities’ labor demand and housing
supply curves. These moments are used to simultaneously
estimate local labor demand, housing supply, and labor supply to cities.
The model is identified using local labor demand shocks
driven by the industry mix in each city and their interactions
with local housing supply elasticities. Variation in produc-
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tivity changes across industries differentially impact cities’
local labor demand for high- and low-skill workers based
on the industrial composition of the city’s workforce (Bartik
1991). I measure exogenous local productivity changes by
interacting cross-sectional differences in industrial employment composition with national changes in industry wage
levels separately for high- and low-skill workers.
I allow cities’ housing supply elasticities to vary based on
geographic constraints on developable land around a city’s
center and land-use regulations (Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers 2008; Saiz 2010). A city’s housing supply elasticity
will influence the equilibrium wage, rent, and population
response to the labor demand shocks driven by industrial
labor demand changes.
Workers’ migration responses to changes in cities’ wages,
rents, and endogenous amenities, driven by the Bartik labor
demand shocks and the interactions of these labor demand
shocks with housing supply elasticity determinants, identify
workers’ preferences for cities’ characteristics. Housing supply elasticities are identified by the response of housing rents
to the Bartik shocks across cities.
The interaction of the Bartik productivity shocks with
cities’ housing markets identifies the labor demand elasticities. The wage differences, driven by the productivity shocks,
induce workers to migrate to cities that offer more desirable
wages. The migration drives demand in the local housing
markets, which impacts housing prices, as determined by
the elasticity of housing supply. Heterogeneity in housing
supply elasticity leads to differences in population changes,
in response to a given Bartik shock. For a given size labor
demand shock, fewer workers will migrate to a city with a
less elastic housing supply because rents increase more than
in a more elastic city. Thus, the interaction of Bartik shocks
with measures of housing supply elasticity creates variation
in high- and low-skill local populations that is independent
of unobserved local productivity changes, which can identify
labor demand elasticities.
The parameter estimates of workers’ preferences show
that while both college and noncollege workers find higher
wages, lower rents, and higher amenity levels desirable,
high-skill workers’ demand is relatively more sensitive
to amenity levels, and low-skill workers’ demand is more
sensitive to wages and rents.6 The labor demand estimates
show that increases in the college employment ratio lead
to productivity spillovers on both college and noncollege
workers. Combining the estimates of firms’ elasticity of labor
substitution with the productivity spillovers, I find that an
increase in a city’s college worker population raises both
local college and noncollege wages. Similarly, an increase in
a city’s noncollege worker population decreases college and
noncollege wages.
Using the estimated model, I decompose the changes in
cities’ college employment ratios into the underlying changes
in labor demand, housing supply, and labor supply to cities. I
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show that when a city’s productivity gap between high- and
low-skill workers exogenously increases, the local wage gap
between these workers increases. If the migration responses
to these wage changes lead to an increase in the local share
of college workers, the wages of all workers will further
increase beyond the initial effect of the productivity change
due to the combination of endogenous productivity changes
and shifts along firms’ labor demand curves.
In addition to raising wages, an increase in a city’s college
employment ratio leads to local amenity improvements. The
combination of desirable wage and amenity growth for all
workers causes large amounts of in-migration, as college
workers are particularly attracted by desirable amenities,
while low-skill workers are particularly attracted by desirable
wages. The increased housing demand in high college
share cities leads to large rent increases. Since low-skill
workers are more price sensitive, the increases in rent disproportionately discourage low-skill workers from living in
these high-wage, high-amenity cities. Lower-skill workers
are not willing to pay the “price” of a lower real wage to live
in high-amenity cities. Thus, in equilibrium, college workers
sort into high-wage, high-rent, high-amenity cities.
I use the model estimates to quantify the change in wellbeing inequality. I find that the welfare impacts due to wage,
rent, and endogenous amenity changes from 1980 to 2000
led to an increase in well-being inequality equivalent to at
least a 24-percentage-point increase in the college wage gap,
which is 20 percent more than the actual increase in the college wage gap. In other words, the additional utility college
workers gained from being able to consume more desirable
amenities made them better off relative to high school graduates, despite the high local housing prices.
This chapter is related to several literatures. Most closely
related to this chapter is work studying how local wages,
rents, and employment respond to local labor demand shocks
(Topel [1986]; Bartik [1991]; Blanchard and Katz [1992];
Saks [2008]); Notowidigdo [2011]. See Moretti [2011a] for
a review). Traditionally, this literature has only allowed local
labor demand shocks to influence worker migration through
changes in wages and rents.7 My results suggest that endogenous local amenity changes are an important mechanism
driving workers’ migration responses to local labor demand
shocks.
A small and growing literature has considered how amenities change in response to the composition of an area’s local
residents (Becker and Murphy 2000, Chapter 5; Bayer,
Ferreira, and McMillan 2007; Card, Mas, and Rothstein
2008; Guerrieri, Hartley, and Hurst 2011; Handbury 2012).
Handbury (2012) studies the desirability and prices of
grocery products for sale across cities. Her work finds that
higher-quality products (an amenity) are more available
in cities with higher incomes per capita, but these areas
also have higher prices for groceries. She finds that higherincome households are more willing to pay for grocery
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quality, leading them to prefer the high-price, high-quality
grocery markets relative to lower-income households. I find
a similar relationship for amenities and local real wages.
My findings also relate to the literature studying changes
in the wage structure and inequality within and between local
labor markets (Berry and Glaeser 2005; Beaudry, Doms, and
Lewis 2010; Moretti 2011b; Autor and Dorn 2012; Autor,
Dorn, and Hanson 2012). Most related to this chapter is
Moretti (2011b), who is the first to show the importance of
accounting for the diverging location choices of high- and
low-skill workers when measuring both real wage and wellbeing inequality changes. Another strand of this literature,
most specifically related to my labor demand estimates, studies the impact of the relative supplies of high- and low-skill
labor on high- and low-skill wages (Katz and Murphy 1992;
Card and Lemieux 2001; Card 2009). Card (2009) estimates
the impact of local labor supply on local wages in cities. This
chapter presents a new identification strategy to estimate
city-level labor demand and allows for endogenous productivity changes.
This chapter is also related to the literature on the social
returns to education (Acemoglu and Angrist 2001; Moretti
2004a,c;) and work studying the determinants of economic
growth in cities (Glaeser et al. 1992; Glaeser, Scheinkman,
and Shleifer 1995; Shapiro 2006). By using the interaction of
local labor productivity shocks with housing supply elasticities as instruments for education differences across cities,
I provide a new identification strategy for measuring the
impact of an increase in a city’s education level on the wages
for all workers. Further, my findings show that an increase
in a city’s education level also spills over onto all workers’
well-being through endogenous amenity changes.
The labor supply model and estimation draws on the
discrete choice methods developed in empirical industrial
organization to estimate consumers’ demand for products
(McFadden 1973; Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995, 2004).
These methods have been applied to estimate households’
preferences for neighborhoods by Bayer, Ferreira, and
McMillan (2007). This chapter adapts these methods to estimate the determinants of workers’ labor supply to cities.8

Chapter 2
Housing Supply Elasticity and Rent Extraction
by State and Local Governments
Can government workers extract rent from private sector
workers by charging high tax rates and paying themselves
high wages? The determinants and justification of government workers’ compensation levels have taken on considerable heat in the past few years, as many states and localities
face budgetary stress. Since state and local governments set
taxes and government employee wages, government employ-
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ees could earn rents by charging high taxes and receiving high wages. There has long been debate over whether
the government acts as a benevolent social planner for its
citizens or uses its market power to benefit its workers and
political interest groups (see Gregory and Borland [1999] for
a review of this literature). In particular, the high unionization rate in the public sector may allow union bargaining to
influence the political process and the decisions of elected
officials (Freeman 1986). In this chapter, I analyze whether
government workers receive higher wages than similar
private sector workers in areas where state and local governments have stronger abilities to exercise market power.
This chapter develops a model where state and local
governments set taxes and the level of government services
to maximize government “profits,” which can then be paid
to employees as excessive wages. I use a Rosen (1979) and
Roback (1982) spatial equilibrium model where workers
maximize their utility by living in the city that offers them
the most utility based on the city’s wage, rental rate of housing, tax rate, government services, and other amenities. Thus,
governments must compete for residents to tax, and workers
can “vote with their feet” by migrating away from excessively rent-extractive governments.
I show that if state and local governments are using their
market power to overpay their employees, their abilities
to extract rents from their citizens are determined by the
equilibrium migration elasticity of private sector residents
with respect to local tax rates. Governments must trade off
the benefits of a higher tax with the cost that a higher tax will
cause workers to migrate away, leaving the government with
a smaller population to tax. This is analogous to the standard
result found in analysis of imperfect competition between
product producers where a firm’s optimal price markup over
cost is equal to the inverse elasticity of consumer demand
with respect to price for the firm’s product.
Unlike firm competition for consumer demand, I show
that a government’s market power to charge excessive taxes
remains even when there are a large number of governments
competing for residents and every government is small.9 The
spatial equilibrium model shows that when a government
raises taxes, workers will migrate away to other jurisdictions.
However, this out-migration decreases the level of labor supply and housing demand in the area. Assuming labor demand
curves slope down and housing supply curves slope up, this
decrease in population raises wages and decreases housing
rents. Thus, some of the disutility of a tax increase will be
offset by an increase in the desirability of local wages and
rents, which limits the amount of out-migration caused by
the tax increase. Since the local housing and labor markets
will respond to government-imposed taxes through migration, the government will always have market power.
An area’s elasticity of housing supply will determine how
local housing rents respond to population changes in an area.
Governments presiding over areas with inelastic housing
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supplies will have more market power than governments
in housing elastic areas. A tax hike by a government in an
area with inelastic housing supply leads to a small amount
of out-migration because housing prices sharply fall due to
the decrease in housing demand driven by the tax hike. The
housing cost decline offsets the negative utility impact of a
tax increase with only a small amount of out-migration in
the housing inelastic area. Thus, governments in housing
inelastic areas can charge higher taxes without shrinking
their tax base since housing price changes limit the migration
response.
If state and local governments exercise more market
power in areas with inelastic housing supplies, the wage gap
between public and private sector workers should be larger
in these areas. I test the model’s prediction by measuring
variation in public-private sector wage gaps across areas
with different housing supply elasticities. I measure workers’
wages using data from the 1995–2011 Current Population
Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-MORG).
I proxy for a metropolitan area’s housing supply elasticity using data from Saiz (2010) on the share of land within
50 kilometers of a city’s center unavailable for real estate
development because of geographic constraints, such as the
presence of swamps, steep grades, or bodies of water. With
less available land around to build on, the city must expand
farther away from the central business area to accommodate
a given amount of population, driving up average housing
costs.10 I also use the Wharton Land Use Regulation Index
from Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2008) as a component of
housing supply elasticity. Since the decision to regulate realestate development is endogenous and possibly correlated
with unobserved characteristics that could impact government workers wages, I focus on the Saiz (2010) measure
of geographic constraints on real estate development as an
exogenous source of variation in housing supply elasticity. These data are the metropolitan area level. To measure
states’ housing supply elasticities I use an average of these
measures across each state’s MSAs, weighted by the MSAs’
populations.
I find that the public-private sector wage gap is higher
in states and metropolitan areas with less elastic housing
supplies. This result holds when analyzing variation in state
government-private sector wage gaps across states and in
local government-private sector wage gaps across MSAs.
This finding is robust to including a host of controls for
workers’ demographics and characteristics, including dummies for three-digit occupation codes. Additionally, the local
government-private sector wage gap is found to be higher in
housing inelastic MSAs, even when only comparing MSAs
within the same state.
As falsification tests, I show that housing supply elasticity has no impact on the federal government worker-private
sector wage gap. Since federal workers’ compensation is not
derived from government revenues of their place of resi-
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dence, the market power of the state and local government
should have no impact on their wages. Additionally, I show
that variation in the state government worker-private sector
wage gap does not vary across MSAs, within a state. The
public-private wage gaps only vary with housing supply elasticities when the housing supply elasticity variation impacts
the government’s market power. I also show that the effect
is larger for government workers who are union members,
suggesting unions allow government workers to bargain for a
larger share of government rents.
The CPS-MORG only reports data on workers’ earnings,
and does not include data on the value of workers’ benefits.
Gittleman and Pierce (2012) show that government employees receive more generous benefits than similar private sector
workers, on average. I use data from average government
pension payouts per beneficiary across states from the census’s 2007–2010 Annual Surveys of Public Employee Retirement Systems as a measure of state government workers’
benefits. While I do not have a data source for similar private
sector workers’ retirement benefits, I show that average
annual state government pension payouts per beneficiary are
higher in states with less elastic housing supplies. This suggests that the wage gap estimates from the CPS understate
the full impact of housing supply elasticity on government
workers’ compensation.
Previous work has also found evidence suggesting government jobs are more desirable than similar private sector
jobs. Gittleman and Pierce (2012) show that public sector
employees are more generously compensated than similarly
qualified private sector employees. In particular, they find
that government workers’ wages tend to be slightly lower
than similar private sector workers. However, the value of
government workers’ benefits strongly outweighs those of
the private sector, leading to public sector employees to be
better compensated overall. Krueger (1988) finds that there
are more job applications for each government job than for
each private sector job, suggesting that government jobs are
more desirable to workers, on average. Additionally, average
job quit rates reported from the 2002–2006 Job Openings and
Labor Turnover Surveys show that average annual quit rate
is 28 percent for private sector workers but only 8 percent for
public sector employees. These facts taken together suggest
that government jobs are better compensated than private
sector jobs, and that there appears to be excess labor supply
for these jobs, which is consistent with government workers receiving rents. While this evidence shows that government jobs appear desirable to workers, it is not clear that this
desirability is due to rent-seeking behavior of governments
exercising market power. This chapter shows that an increase
in governments’ abilities to extract rent directly leads to better paid government employees.
The public sector workforce is also highly unionized,
enabling government employees to bargain for government
rents. Gyourko and Tracy (1991) use a spatial equilibrium
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model to show that if the cost of government taxes to citizens
are not completely offset by benefits of government services,
they will be capitalized into housing prices. Similarly, if high
levels of public sector unionization lead to more government
rent extraction, the public sector unionization rate will proxy
for government waste and also be capitalized into housing
prices. While Gyourko and Tracy (1991) find evidence for
both of these effects, it is unclear what drives the variation
in taxes and unionization rates across localities. This chapter
uses housing supply elasticity as a source of exogenous variation in government market power to assess whether governments take advantage of their power to overpay employees.

Chapter 3
Clustering, Spatial Correlations, and
Randomization Inference
Many economic studies that analyze the causal effects of
interventions on economic behavior study interventions or
treatments that are constant within clusters whereas the outcomes vary at a more disaggregate level. In a typical example, and the one we focus on in this chapter, outcomes are
measured at the individual level, whereas interventions vary
only at the state (cluster) level. This is a common econometric problem when using geographic variation to study
local labor market outcomes, such as workers’ wages. Often,
the effect of interventions is estimated using least squares
regression. Since the mid-eighties empirical researchers in
social sciences have generally been aware of the implications
of within-cluster correlations in outcomes for the precision
of such estimates (Liang and Zeger 1986; Moulton 1986).
The typical approach is to allow for correlation between
outcomes in the same state in the specification of the error
covariance matrix. However, there may well be more complex correlation patterns in the data. Correlation in outcomes
between individuals may extend beyond state boundaries,
it may vary in magnitude between states, and it may be stronger in more narrowly defined geographical areas.
In this chapter we investigate the implications, for the
repeated sampling variation of least squares estimators based
on individual-level data, of the presence of correlation structures beyond those that are constant within states, identical
across states, and vanish between states. First, we address
the empirical question of whether such correlation patterns
are present in census data on earnings with states as clusters.
We estimate general spatial correlations for the logarithm of
earnings and find that, indeed, such correlations are present,
with substantial correlations within groups of nearby states
and correlations within smaller geographic units (specifically
public use microdata areas) considerably larger than within
states. Second, we address whether accounting for such
correlations is important for the properties of confidence
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intervals for the effects of state-level regulations or interventions. We report theoretical results and demonstrate their
relevance using illustrations based on earnings data and state
regulations, as well as Monte Carlo evidence. The theoretical
results show that if covariate values are as good as randomly
assigned to clusters, implying that there is no spatial correlation in the covariates beyond the clusters, variance estimators that incorporate only cluster-level outcome correlations
remain valid despite the misspecification of the error-covariance matrix. Whether this theoretical result is useful in
practice depends on the magnitude of the spatial correlations
in the covariates. We provide some illustrations that show
that, given the spatial correlation patterns we find in the
individual-level variables, spatial correlations in state-level
regulations can have a substantial impact on the precision of
estimates of the effects of interventions.
This chapter draws on three strands of literature that
have largely evolved separately. First, it is related to the
literature on clustering, where a primary focus is on adjustments to standard errors to take into account clustering of
explanatory variables. (See, e.g., Liang and Zeger [1986];
Moulton [1986]; Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan [2004];
Hansen [2007]; and the textbook discussions in Diggle et
al. [2002]; Wooldridge [2002]); and Angrist and Pischke
[2009]. Second, it draws on the literature on spatial statistics.
Here a major focus is on the specification and estimation of
the covariance structure of spatially linked data. For textbook discussions, see Schabenberger and Gotway (2004)
and Gelfand et al. (2010). In interesting recent work Bester,
Conley, and Hansen (2011) and Ibragimov and Muller (2010)
link some of the inferential issues in the spatial and clustering literatures. Finally, we use results from the literature
on randomization inference going back to Fisher (1925)
and Neyman (1990). For a recent textbook discussion see
Rosenbaum (2002). Although the calculation of Fisher exact
p-values based on randomization inference is frequently
used in the spatial statistics literature (Schabenberger and
Gotway 2004), and sometimes in the clustering literature
(Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004; Abadie, Diamond,
and Hainmueller 2010), Neyman’s approach to constructing
confidence intervals using the randomization distribution is
rarely used in these settings. We will argue that the randomization perspective provides useful insights into the interpretation and properties of confidence intervals in the context of
spatially linked data.

Notes
1.
2.
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the differential labor demands for high- and low-skill workers
across industries.
3. The Detroit Symphony Orchestra was one of the top in the
nation during the 1950s. More recently, it has defaulted on
loans and is facing a labor dispute over wage cuts driven by
decreased ticket sales and corporate donations (Bennett 2010).
The Boston Symphony Orchestra, however, continues to be one
of the best in the world.
4. The model could be extended to allow for dynamics, as done
by Kennan and Walker (2011) and Bishop (2010). However,
panel data are needed to estimate a model of this nature. I focus
on the role of preference heterogeneity in determining longrun migration patterns, while Kennan and Walker (2011) and
Bishop (2010) focus exclusively on high school graduates and
life-cycle migration patterns.
5. Estimation of spatial equilibrium models when households
have heterogeneous preferences using hedonics have been
analyzed by Epple and Sieg (1999).
6. These results are consistent with a large body of work in
empirical industrial organization that finds substantial heterogeneity in consumers’ price sensitivities. A consumer’s price
sensitivity is also found to be closely linked to his income. See
Nevo (2010) for a review of this literature.
7. Notowidigdo (2011) allows government social insurance programs in a city to endogenously respond to local wages, which
is one of many endogenous amenity changes.
8. Similar methods have been used by Bayer, Keohane, and Timmins (2009); Bishop (2010); and Kennan and Walker (2011) to
estimate workers’ preferences for cities. However, these papers
do not allow local wages and rents to be freely correlated with
local amenities. Bayer, Keohane, and Timmins (2009) focus on
the demand for air quality, while Bishop (2010) and Kennan
and Walker (2011) study the dynamics of migration over the
life cycle exclusively for high school graduates.
9. This result is closely related to Epple and Zelenitz (1981),
which shows that worker migration between government jurisdictions is not enough to entirely compete away a government’s
market power.
10. A full microfoundation of this mechanism can be derived
from the Alonso-Muth-Mills model (Brueckner 1987), where
housing expands around a city’s central business district and
workers must commute from their house to the city center to
work. Within-city housing prices are set such that workers are
indifferent between having a shorter versus longer commute
to work. Average housing prices rise as the population grows
since the houses on the edge of the city must offer the same
utility as the houses closer in. As the city population expands,
the edge of the city becomes farther away from the center, making the commuting costs of workers living on the edge higher
than those in a smaller city. Since the edge of the city must
offer the same utility value as the center of the city, housing
prices rise in the interior parts of the city.

This large increase in wage inequality has led to an active area
of research into the drivers of changes in the wage distribution
nationwide. See Goldin and Katz (2007) for a recent survey.
Work by Berry and Glaeser (2005) and Moretti (2011b) comes
to similar conclusions. Berry and Glaeser (2005) consider the
role of entrepreneurship in cities. Moretti (2011b) analyzes
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